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Domestic Violence, Gun Possession,
and the Importance of Context
WESLEY M. OLIVER*
Context is everything.
A federal law prohibits those convicted of committing an act of domestic
violence from possessing weapons.1 This term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
that this statute would apply even to those convicted of crimes that did not
necessarily involve violent acts.2 This conclusion strains the ordinary meaning of
language, but is quite consistent with a long tradition in criminal cases that favors a
pro-government interpretation of a statute when the public welfare is at stake. And
domestic violence, Justice Sotomayor stressed in her opinion, has reached epidemic
levels, prompting Congress to get guns out of the hands of abusers.3
Congress in 1996 expanded existing felon-in-possession laws that forbid the
possession of a firearm, or any commerce involving a firearm, by any person who
has committed a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”4 The statute defines
such a misdemeanor as one involving “the use or attempted use of physical force”
against a spouse, child, or similarly situated person.5
The Supreme Court’s opinion this term in United States v. Castleman concluded
that even a misdemeanor involving only an “offensive touching” was sufficient to
trigger the prohibition.6 Viewed entirely through the lens of the statute, this result is
particularly surprising. Just four years ago, the Supreme Court interpreted another
provision of this same statute and concluded that something more than a mere
unwanted touching was required to satisfy the requirement of “physical force.”7
In 2010, the Court in Johnson v. United States interpreted another federal
provision forbidding firearm possession by those with criminal records.8 Johnson
considered whether a simple battery conviction was sufficient to enhance a
defendant’s sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The
enhancement applied if a defendant possessed a firearm having previously
committed three “violent felonies,” which were defined as “any crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another . . . .”9 The ACCA thus included the same “physical force” requirement as
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the federal prohibition of gun possession by those convicted of misdemeanor acts
of domestic violence.
In Johnson, however, the Court concluded that a charge of simple battery—
which could be no more than an offensive touching—did not necessarily constitute
“physical force.”10 The defendant in Johnson had three prior state convictions in
Florida that the government offered as the predicates for the enhancement under the
ACCA: an aggravated battery, a burglary, and a simple battery (which state law
defined as a felony because of his prior record).11 The record before the Supreme
Court did not indicate how the state proved the simple battery. There were two
ways to demonstrate the defendant’s guilt, either through “[a]ctually and
intentionally touch[ing] or strik[ing] another person against that person’s will,” or
“[i]ntentionally caus[ing] bodily harm to another person.”12 Johnson’s battery
conviction therefore may have required the prosecution to prove nothing more than
minimal undesired contact.
At common law, simple battery required “force” as an element, and offensive
touching was sufficient to satisfy this element. In Johnson, however, the Court
recognized that the ACCA added something to the common law requirement for
simple battery, identifying only crimes involving “physical force.”13 Further, the
Court noted that “physical force” was being used to define the term “violent
felony,” which “connotes a substantial degree of force.”14 “Physical force,” the
Court concluded, must be force that is “capable of causing physical pain or injury
to another person.”15
In Castleman, by contrast, the Court concluded that a federal law prohibiting the
possession of firearms by those convicted of misdemeanors involving domestic
violence (that is, limited by Congressional definition to crimes involving “physical
force”) could be triggered just by a conviction of unwanted touching of an intimate
partner.16 The majority concluded that the context of the term “physical force”
mattered. In Johnson, it was used to define violent felony; in Castleman, it was
used to define an act of domestic violence.17 While the term violent felony
“connotes a substantial degree of force,” Justice Sotomayor wrote, “that is not true
of ‘domestic violence,’ which is a term of art encompassing acts that one might not
characterize as ‘violent’ in a nondomestic context.”18
The Castleman ruling resulted in the same phrase having different meanings in
the same statute—ideally, Justice Scalia pointed out, something courts tend to
avoid.19 Scalia further observed that nothing about Castleman required the broad
rule or the conflicting statutory interpretation that the majority created.20 Castleman
had been convicted under a Tennessee statute forbidding “intentionally or
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knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury” to another.21 The record thus clearly reflected
not only that he had done something more than an offensive touching, it
demonstrated that his actions satisfied Johnson’s standard for physical force. Force
that has caused injury is certainly force capable of causing injury.
The result in Castleman is explained not just by the phrase “physical force,” but
by the broader context of the case. While Castleman’s conviction would have been
affirmed under either Sotomayor’s or Scalia’s interpretation of the statute, there is a
substantial practical distinction between the approaches of the two justices in this
opinion. Justice Sotomayor’s interpretation of “physical force” would forbid a
much larger category of persons from possessing guns than Justice Scalia’s
interpretation.
In light of the Johnson case, Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion doubtlessly
stretches traditional concepts of statutory interpretation and stare decisis, but is
very consistent with the broad interpretation courts give to criminal laws enacted to
protect the public from future harm. Much of criminal law is designed to prevent
harm by deterring dangerous acts.22 Sometimes, however, the criminal law
punishes relatively minor acts that themselves are not harmful but may ripen into
something dangerous.23 Drugs mislabeled by a manufacturer pose a danger to all
the potential purchasers greatly disproportionate to the initial careless act.24
Individuals who drive while intoxicated pose an extraordinary risk to other
motorists.25 When courts encounter statutes with public welfare goals, they tend to
give the legislature’s language as broad a reach as is reasonably possible.26 This
seems to be an implicit, and close to explicit, reason for the majority’s opinion in
Castleman.
The opinion began not with a statement of the narrow issue but rather with a
discussion of the background of the act in question: “Recognizing that ‘[f]irearms
and domestic strife are a potentially deadly combination,’ Congress forbade the
possession of firearms by anyone convicted of ‘a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence.’”27 The Court then observed that there are a million victims of domestic
abuse annually, with hundreds of those incidents resulting in death. The Court
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noted that “[d]omestic violence often escalates in severity over time, and the
presence of a firearm increases the likelihood that it will escalate to
homicide . . . .”28 Finally, the majority observed that one Senator speaking in favor
of this provision stated that “‘all too often,’ . . . ‘the only difference between a
battered woman and a dead woman is the presence of a gun.’”29
If the work of the Court in Castleman is judged by its adherence to canons of
statutory interpretation, the opinion may come up lacking.30 If, however, the Court
is judged on its interpretation of a public welfare statute—or something akin to a
public welfare statute—its broad interpretation is quite consistent with a long line
criminal law cases. Courts often face ambiguous language, or even language
seeming to strongly limit liability, and conclude that strong public policy, designed
to protect the welfare of citizens, permits a broad view of a criminal statute, the
rule of lenity notwithstanding.31
Often courts will not even acknowledge the tension between the statutory
language and the strong public policy. For example, a majority of state legislatures
expressly recognize the legitimacy of faith healing as an accepted method of
treatment for medical illness.32 When, however, a child’s death results from the
failure to seek medical treatment, courts have been unreceptive to the logical
extension of this legislatively mandated religious tolerance. They uniformly reject
these statutes as a defense to manslaughter based solely on their interpretation of
the statutory language.33
A Massachusetts case illustrates the extent to which courts will stretch statutory
language to preserve a public policy encouraging even the most devout Christian
Scientist parents to seek medical attention when the lives of their children are in
danger.34 David and Ginger Twitchell relied entirely on prayer as their two-and-ahalf year old son died from the consequences of peritonitis caused by the
perforation of his bowel, a condition easily remediable by surgery.35 The
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Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Twitchells relied on a Massachusetts statute, quoted in their church’s literature, that
said: “A child shall not be deemed to be neglected or lack proper physical care for
the sole reason that he is being provided remedial treatment by spiritual means
alone in accordance with the tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious
denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof.”36
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed that this language was
adopted by the legislature in a statute titled “An Act defining the term ‘proper
physical care’ under the law relative to care of children by a parent.”37 The court
concluded that this provision “refer[red] to neglect and lack of proper physical
care,” which could be demonstrated by either “(1) neglect to provide support [or]
(2) willful failure to provide necessary and proper care.”38 These concepts, the
court concluded, were not relevant to a homicide prosecution. By the reasoning of
the court, “wanton and reckless conduct,” which was required to demonstrate
homicide, “is not a form of negligence” nor does it “involve a wilful intention to
cause the resulting harm.”39 To describe the court’s reasoning as tortured would be
generous, but the public policy supported by the decision was obviously
compelling. Even in a country that respects religious diversity, society has an
extraordinary interest in ensuring that toddlers not die because of their parents’
faith.
In the context of strict liability crimes, courts have been more explicit about
recognizing that they were construing ambiguous statutes in favor of the state
because a public welfare interest animated the legislature to act. Legislatures are
rarely clear about their desire to eliminate a mens rea requirement for a crime.40 In
virtually every instance in which a court has concluded that a crime does not
require culpability, legislatures have simply been silent on what mental state is
required—and, often, these legislatures have instructed courts to find that a mens
rea term is implicitly required unless the legislative intent to exclude one is clear.41
Courts are thus typically facing ambiguity, with a presumption against strict
liability, whenever they conclude that no mens rea is required for a crime. Yet
courts frequently find, with no statutory language or legislative history, that the
legislature intended to fashion a strict liability crime. Most often, a court’s
conclusion that the legislature intended to deter a relatively minor crime to prevent
some serious social harm is sufficient for it to find that the crime is one of strict
liability.42
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Id. at 612 n.4. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 273, § 1 (1992)). This provision of the law
was repealed as a result of this case. Ciullo, supra note 32, at 182–83.
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Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 615.
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See Daryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict Liability, 62
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See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.5(a) 291 (5th ed. 2010) (recognizing a variety
of factors courts use to determine whether a statute contains a strict liability offense, but
noting “the more serious the consequences to the public, the more likely the legislature
meant to impose liability without regard to fault and vice versa”).
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Strict liability crimes are largely a creation of the modern regulatory state. The
justification for such crimes has evolved and become more sophisticated over the
course of the twentieth century.43 United States v. Balint is typically taught as the
paradigmatic case in which the Supreme Court permitted a conviction without
requiring the prosecution to demonstrate criminal culpability. This was certainly
one of the earlier examples of judicially recognized strict liability, though (as
Balint itself recognizes) other decisions approving of strict liability crimes predated
it.44 Balint concluded that statutes can be reasonably interpreted to have omitted a
mens rea requirement when the statute in question seeks to achieve “some social
betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se.”45
Subsequent cases have offered a variety of factors for courts to consider in
evaluating whether, in the absence of a stated mens rea requirement, a court should
conclude that the legislature intended a strict liability offense—but a public welfare
exception has remained as the most frequently cited factor.46
Almost exactly forty years ago, Judge Breitel on the New York Court of
Appeals concluded, much like Justice Sotomayor, that statutes should be
interpreted differently when the primary aim of the statute is to prevent future harm
rather than punish past criminal acts. In People v. Alamo, the New York court
considered whether breaking into a car and sitting behind the wheel constituted a
completed act of larceny or merely an attempt when the police intercepted the
would-be car thief.47 The majority concluded that achieving dominion and control
over a vehicle is sufficient for a conviction for driving while intoxicated if the
would-be driver is drunk, and therefore should also be sufficient for a larceny
conviction.48 The majority observed that “consistency is always desirable in the
application of various laws.”49 In dissent, Judge Breitel presented a persuasive
argument for the contrary result. He observed that “[t]he statutory proscription
against persons operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated is directed at a different
evil involving a lesser degree of turpitude and a special problem of proof hardly
applicable to larceny.”50 That “different evil” was, of course, the risk that drunken
driving would lead to fatalities, while larceny certainly does not naturally ripen into
a risk to human life.
Justice Scalia’s criticisms of the majority opinion in Castleman are well founded
if courts are expected to look only to the legislative text and not to the goals of
Congress. An appreciation of the broader context of criminal statutes has, however,
long animated judges. There is as at least as much of a tradition of broadly

43

See Levenson, supra note 23, at 419 (noting that strict liability offenses were
“promulgated to address the dangers brought about by the advent of the industrial
revolution”). See also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922) (“[T]he general rule
at common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of
every crime.”).
44
Balint, 258 U.S. at 252.
45
Id.
46
See Dannye Holley, Culpability Evaluations in the State Supreme Courts from 1977 to
1999: A “Model” Assessment, 34 AKRON L. REV. 401, 405–07 (2001).
47
315 N.E.2d 446 (N.Y. 1974).
48
Id. at 449–50.
49
Id. at 449.
50
Id. at 451 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
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construing public welfare statutes as there is of ensuring that legislative terms are
consistently construed. Perhaps not accidentally, the Court agreed to hear this case
within months of the twentieth anniversary of the passage of the Violence Against
Women Act.51 The fear of battery ripening into homicide ultimately presented, for
the Court, a public safety concern analogous to those used by many other courts to
justify a broader interpretation of statutes than their texts would seem to permit.

51

The Act was made law on September 13, 1994. See Violence Against Women Act of
1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

